撒穆尔·伊诺克·斯通普夫（Samuel Enoch
Stumpf，1918—1998），芝加哥大学哲学博士、哈佛大学福特研究员、牛津大学洛克菲勒研究员。他担任万德比尔特大学哲学系主任有15年之久，并曾出任爱荷华的康奈尔学院的校长。斯通普夫也是万德比尔特大学的法律哲学教授和医学哲学教授，在哲学、医学伦理学和法理学等领域均颇有建树。
詹姆斯·菲泽（James Fieser），普渡大学博士，现任田纳西大学哲学教授。著述有《道德哲学史》（Moral
Philosophy through the Ages，2001），与人合著有《哲学入门》（A Historical
Introduction to Philosophy，2002）。菲泽还与人合编《世界宗教经典》（Scriptures of the
World’s Religions）一书，并创建了《哲学网络百科全书》（Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy）。
目錄：
出版前言
中文版序
第八版译者序
第七版译者序
关于作者
前 言
Part One ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY
第一部分 古希腊哲学
Chapter 1 Socrates’ Predecessors 苏格拉底的前辈
What is Permanent in Existence? 什么东西是持存的？
Thales 泰勒斯
Anaximander 阿那克西曼德
Anaximenes 阿那克西米尼
The Mathematical Basis of All Things 万物的数学基础
Pythagoras 毕达哥拉斯
Attempts to Explain Change 解释变化的尝试
Heraclitus 赫拉克利特
Parmenides 巴门尼德
Zeno 芝 诺
Empedocles 恩培多克勒
Anaxagoras 阿那克萨戈拉
The Atomists 原子论者
Atoms and the Void 原子和虚空
Theory of Knowledge and Ethics 知识理论和伦理学
Chapter 2 The Sophists and Socrates 智者派与苏格拉底
The Sophists 智者派
Protagoras 普罗泰戈拉
Gorgias 高尔吉亚
Thrasymachus 塞拉西马柯
Socrates 苏格拉底
Socrates’ Life 苏格拉底的生平
Socrates as a Philosopher 作为哲学家的苏格拉底
Socrates’ Theory of Knowledge: Intellectual Midwifery
苏格拉底的知识理论：思想的助产术
Socrates’ Moral Thought 苏格拉底的道德思想
Socrates’ Trial and Death 苏格拉底的审判和死亡
Chapter 3 Plato 柏拉图
Plato’s Life 柏拉图的生平
Theory of Knowledge 知识理论
The Cave 洞 穴
The Divided Line 线 段
Theory of the Forms 理念论
Moral Philosophy 道德哲学
The Concept of the Soul 灵魂概念
The Cause of Evil: Ignorance or Forgetfulness 恶的原因：无知或遗忘
Recovering Lost Morality 恢复失去的道德
Virtue as Fulfillment of Function 作为功能之实现的德性
Political Philosophy 政治哲学
The State as a Giant Person 巨人般的国家
The Philosopher-King 哲学王
The Virtues in the State 国家中的德性
The Decline of the Ideal State 理想国的衰败
View of the Cosmos 宇宙观
Chapter 4 Aristotle 亚里士多德
Aristotle’s Life 亚里士多德的生平
Logic 逻辑学
The Categories and the Starting Point of Reasoning 范畴和推理的起点
The Syllogism 三段论
Metaphysics 形而上学
The Problem of Metaphysics Defined 界定形而上学的问题
Substance as the Primary Essence of Things 作为事物的首要本质的实体
Matter and Form 质料和形式
The Process of Change: The Four Causes 变化的过程：四因
Potentiality and Actuality 潜能与现实
The Unmoved Mover 不被推动的推动者
The Place of Humans: Physics, Biology, and Psychology
人的地位：物理学、生物学和心理学
Physics 物理学
Biology 生物学
Psychology 心理学
Ethics 伦理学
Types of “Ends” “目的”的类型
The Function of Human Beings 人的功能
Happiness as the End 作为目的的幸福
Virtue as the Golden Mean 作为中道的德性
Deliberation and Choice 审慎和选择
Contemplation 沉 思
Politics 政治学
Types of States 国家类型
Differences and Inequalities 差异与不平等
Good Government and Revolution 好的政体和革命
Philosophy of Art 艺术哲学
Part Two HELLENISTIC AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
第二部分 希腊化时期和中世纪的哲学
Chapter 5 Classical Philosophy after Aristotle
亚里士多德以后的古代哲学
Epicureanism 伊壁鸠鲁主义
Physics and Ethics 物理学与伦理学
God and Death 神和死亡
The Pleasure Principle 快乐原则
Pleasure and Social Justice 快乐与社会正义
Stoicism 斯多噶主义
Wisdom and Control versus Pleasure 相对于快乐的智慧和控制
Stoic Theory of Knowledge 斯多噶学派的知识论
Matter as the Basis of All Reality 作为一切实在之基础的物质
God in Everything 万物中的神
Fate and Providence 命运和天意
Human Nature 人的本性
Ethics and the Human Drama 伦理学和人的戏剧
The Problem of Freedom 自由的问题
Cosmopolitanism and Justice 世界主义和正义
Skepticism 怀疑主义
The Search for Mental Peace 寻求心灵的安宁
Evident versus Nonevident Matters 明显的事情和不明显的事情
Plotinus 普罗提诺
Plotinus’s Life 普罗提诺的生平
God as the One 作为太一的神
The Metaphor of Emanation 流溢的隐喻
Salvation 得 救
Chapter 6 Augustine 奥古斯丁
Augustine’s Life 奥古斯丁的生平
Human Knowledge 人类知识
Faith and Reason 信仰与理性
Overcoming Skepticism 克服怀疑论
Knowledge and Sensation 知识与感觉
The Theory of Illumination 光照论
God 上 帝
The Created World 被造世界
Creation from Nothing 从无中创世
The Seminal Principles 种 质
Moral Philosophy 道德哲学
The Role of Love 爱的作用
Free Will as the Cause of Evil 作为恶的原因的自由意志
Justice 正 义
History and the Two Cities 历史和两座城
Chapter 7 Philosophy in the Early Middle Ages
中世纪早期的哲学
Boethius 波埃修
Boethius’s Life 波埃修的生平
The Consolation of Philosophy 哲学的慰藉
The Problem of Universals 共相的问题
Pseudo-Dionysius 伪狄奥尼修斯
Knowledge of God 对上帝的知识
Erigena 约翰?司各脱?爱留根纳
Erigena’s Life 约翰?司各脱?爱留根纳的生平
The Division of Nature 自然的区分
New Solutions to the Problem of Universals 解决共相问题的新方法
Odo and Guillaume: Exaggerated Realism 奥多和威廉姆：极端实在论
Roscellinus: Nominalism 洛色林：唯名论
Abelard: Conceptualism or Moderate Realism
阿伯拉尔：概念论或温和实在论
Anselm’s Ontological Argument 安瑟伦的本体论证明
Anselm’s Realism 安瑟伦的实在论
The Ontological Argument 本体论证明
Gaunilon’s Rebuttal 高尼罗的反驳
Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilon 安瑟伦对高尼罗的回答
Faith and Reason in Muslim and Jewish Thought
穆斯林和犹太思想中的信仰和理性
Avicenna 阿维森纳
Averro s 阿威罗伊
Moses Maimonides 摩西?迈蒙尼德
Chapter 8 Aquinas and His Late Medieval Successors
阿奎那和他的中世纪晚期的继承者
Aquinas’s Life 阿奎那的生平
Bonaventura and the University of Paris 波那文都和巴黎大学
Philosophy and Theology 哲学与神学
Faith and Reason 信仰与理性
Proofs of God’s Existence 上帝存在的证明
Proofs from Motion, Efficient Cause, and Necessary Being
从运动、致动因以及必然存在出发的证明
Proofs from Perfection and Order 从完满性和秩序出发的证明
Assessment of the Proofs 对证明的评价
Knowledge of God’s Nature 对上帝本性的知识
The Negative Way Via Negativa 否定的方式
Knowledge by Analogy 类比的知识
Creation 创 世
Is the Created Order Eternal? 被创造的秩序是永恒的吗？
Creation out of Nothing 无中创世
Is This the Best Possible World? 这是最好的可能世界吗？
Evil as Privation 作为缺乏的恶
The Range of Created Being: The Chain of Being
被创造的存在的等级排列：存在之链
Morality and Natural Law 道德和自然法
Moral Constitution 道德的构成
Natural Law 自然法
The State 国 家
Human Nature and Knowledge 人的本性和知识
Human Nature 人的本性
Knowledge 知 识
Scotus, Ockham, and Eckhart 司各脱、奥康以及艾克哈特
Voluntarism 唯意志论
Nominalism 唯名论
Mysticism 神秘论
Part Three EARLY MODERN PHILOSOPHY
第三部分 近代早期的哲学
Chapter 9 Philosophy during the Renaissance
文艺复兴时期的哲学
The Closing of the Middle Ages 中世纪的结束
Humanism and the Italian Renaissance
人文主义和意大利文艺复兴运动
Pico 皮 科
Machiavelli 马基雅维利
The Reformation 宗教改革
Luther 路 德
Erasmus 伊拉斯谟
Skepticism and Faith 怀疑论和信仰
Montaigne 蒙 田
Pascal 帕斯卡
The Scientific Revolution 科学革命
New Discoveries and New Methods 新的发现和新的方法
Modern Atomism 近代原子论
Bacon 弗朗西斯?培根
Bacon’s Life 培根的生平
Distempers of Learning 学术的病状
Idols of the Mind 心灵的假相
The Inductive Method 归纳的方法
Hobbes 托马斯?霍布斯
Hobbes’s Life 霍布斯的生平
Influence of Geometry upon Hobbes’s Thought 几何学对霍布斯思想的影响
Bodies in Motion: The Object of Thought 运动中的物体：思想的对象
Mechanical View of Human Thought 关于人的思想的机械论观点
Political Philosophy and Morality 政治哲学与道德
The State of Nature 自然状态
Obligation in the State of Nature 自然状态中的义务
The Social Contract 社会契约
Civil Law versus Natural Law 民法对自然法
Chapter 10 Rationalism on the Continent 大陆理性主义
Descartes 笛卡尔
Descartes’s Life 笛卡尔的生平
The Quest for Certainty 对确定性的追求
Descartes’s Method 笛卡尔的方法
Methodic Doubt 作为方法的怀疑
The Existence of God and External Things 上帝和外部事物的存在
Mind and Body 心灵和身体
Spinoza 斯宾诺莎
Spinoza’s Life 斯宾诺莎的生平
Spinoza’s Method 斯宾诺莎的方法
God: Substance and Attribute 上帝：实体和属性
The World as Modes of God’s Attributes 世界作为上帝属性的样式
Knowledge, Mind, and Body 知识、心灵和身体
Ethics 伦理学
Leibniz 莱布尼茨
Leibniz’s Life 莱布尼茨的生平
Substance 实 体
God’s Existence 上帝的存在
Knowledge and Nature 知识和自然
Chapter 11 Empiricism in Britain 英国经验主义
Locke 洛 克
Locke’s Life 洛克的生平
Locke’s Theory of Knowledge 洛克的知识理论
Moral and Political Theory 洛克的道德和政治理论
Berkeley 贝克莱
Berkeley’s Life 贝克莱的生平
The Nature of Existence 存在的本质
Matter and Substance 物质和实体
Hume 休 谟
Hume’s Life 休谟的生平
Hume’s Theory of Knowledge 休谟的知识理论
What Exists External to Us? 什么存在于我们之外？
Ethics 伦理学
Chapter 12 Enlightenment Philosophy 启蒙哲学
Deism and Atheism 自然神论和无神论
English Deism 英国自然神论
French Philosophes 法国哲人派
Rousseau 卢 梭
Rousseau’s Life 卢梭的生平
The Paradox of Learning 学问的悖论
The Social Contract 社会契约
Reid 锐 德
Reid’s Life 锐德的生平
Criticism of the Theory of Ideas 对观念论的批判
Commonsense Beliefs and Direct Realism 常识信念与直接实在论
Part Four LATE MODERN AND NINETEENTHCENTURY PHILOSOPHY
第四部分 近代晚期和19 世纪哲学
Chapter 13 Kant 康 德
Kant’s Life 康德的生平
The Shaping of Kant’s Problem 康德问题的形成
Kant’s Critical Philosophy and his Copernican Revolution
康德的批判哲学和他的哥白尼革命
The Way of Critical Philosophy 批判哲学的方法
The Nature of a Priori Knowledge 先天知识的本质
The Synthetic a Priori 先天综合判断
Kant’s Copernican Revolution 康德的哥白尼革命
The Structure of Rational Thought 理性思想的结构
The Categories of Thought and the Forms of
Intuition 思想范畴和直观形式
The Self and the Unity of Experience 自我和经验的统一
Phenomenal and Noumenal Reality 现象实在和本体实在
Transcendental Ideas of Pure Reason as Regulative Concepts
作为调节性概念的纯粹理性的先验理念
The Antinomies and the Limits of Reason 二律背反和理性的限度
Proofs of God’s Existence 上帝存在的证明
Practical Reason 实践理性
The Basis of Moral Knowledge 道德知识的基础
Morality and Rationality 道德与理性
“Good” Defined as the Good Will 被定义为善良意志的“善”
The Categorical Imperative 定言命令
The Moral Postulates 道德悬设
Aesthetics: The Beautiful 美学：美
The Beautiful as Independent Pleasant Satisfaction
美是不带任何利害而令人愉悦的东西
The Beautiful as an Object of Universal Delight 美是普遍愉悦的对象
Finality versus Purpose in the Beautiful Object
美的对象中的目的与合目的性
Necessity, Common Sense, and the Beautiful 必然性、共通感和美
Chapter 14 German Idealism 德国唯心主义
Kant’s Impact on German Thought 康德对德国思想的影响
Hegel 黑格尔
Hegel’s Life 黑格尔的生平
Absolute Mind 绝对精神
The Nature of Reality 实在的本质
Ethics and Politics 伦理与政治
Absolute Spirit 绝对精神
Schopenhauer 叔本华
Schopenhauer’s Life 叔本华的生平
The Principle of Sufficient Reason 充足理由律
The World as Will and Idea 作为意志和表象的世界
The Ground of Pessimism 悲观主义的基础
Is There Any Escape from the “Will”? 有可能摆脱“意志”吗？
Chapter 15 Utilitarianism and Positivism
功利主义和实证主义
Bentham 边 沁
Bentham’s Life 边沁的生平
The Principle of Utility 功利原则
Law and Punishment 法律和惩罚
Bentham’s Radicalism 边沁的激进主义
John Stuart Mill 约翰?斯图亚特?密尔
Mill’s Life 密尔的生平
Mill’s Utilitarianism 密尔的功利主义
Liberty 自 由
Comte 孔 德
Comte’s Life and Times 孔德的生平和时代
Positivism Defined 实证主义的定义
The Law of the Three Stages 三阶段法则
Comte’s Sociology and “Religion of Humanity”
孔德的社会学和“人道教”
Chapter 16 Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche
克尔恺廓尔、马克思与尼采
Kierkegaard 克尔恺廓尔
Kierkegaard’s Life 克尔恺廓尔的生平
Human Existence 人的存在
Truth as Subjectivity 作为主观性的真理
The Aesthetic Stage 美学阶段
The Ethical Stage 伦理阶段
The Religious Stage 宗教阶段
Marx 马克思
Marx’s Life and Influences 马克思的生平和影响
The Epochs of History: Marx’s Dialectic
历史的诸阶段：马克思的辩证法
The Substructure: The Material Order 基础：物质秩序
The Alienation of Labor 劳动异化
The Superstructure: The Origin and Role of Ideas
上层建筑：观念的来源和作用
Nietzsche 尼 采
Nietzsche’s Life 尼采的生平
“God Is Dead” “上帝死了”
The Apollonian versus Dionysian 阿波罗精神与狄俄尼索斯精神
Master Morality versus Slave Morality 主人道德与奴隶道德
The Will to Power 权力意志
Revaluation of All Morals 重估一切道德
The Superperson 超 人
Part Five TWENTIETH-CENTURY AND CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
第五部分 20 世纪和当代哲学
Chapter 17 Pragmatism and Process Philosophy
实用主义和过程哲学
Pragmatism 实用主义
Peirce 皮尔士
Peirce’s Life 皮尔士的生平
A Theory of Meaning 意义理论
The Role of Belief 信念的地位
The Elements of Method 方法的要素
James 詹姆斯
James’s Life 詹姆斯的生平
Pragmatism as a Method 作为方法的实用主义
The Pragmatic Theory of Truth 实用主义的真理论
Free Will 自由意志
The Will to Believe 相信的意志
Dewey 杜 威
Dewey’s Life 杜威的生平
The Spectator versus Experience 旁观者与经验
Habit, Intelligence, and Learning 习惯、智力和学习
Value in a World of Fact 事实世界里的价值
Process Philosophy 过程哲学
Bergson 柏格森
Bergson’s Life 柏格森的生平
Going Around versus Entering Into 绕行和进入
The Scientific Way of Analysis 科学的分析方法
The Metaphysical Way of Intuition 形而上学的直觉方法
The Process of Duration 绵延的过程
Evolution and the Vital Impulse 进化和生命冲动
Morality and Religion 道德和宗教
Whitehead 怀特海
Whitehead’s Life 怀特海的生平
The Error of Simple Location 简单定位的错误
Self-Consciousness 自我意识
Prehension 把 握
Eternal Objects 永恒客体
Chapter 18 Analytic Philosophy 分析哲学
Russell 伯特兰?罗素
Russell’s Mission 罗素的任务
Logical Atomism 逻辑原子主义
Problems with Logical Atomism 逻辑原子主义的困难
Logical Positivism 逻辑实证主义
The Principle of Verification 证实原则
Carnap’s Logical Analysis 卡尔纳普的逻辑分析
Problems with Logical Positivism 逻辑实证主义的疑难
Quine’s Critique of Empiricism 蒯因对经验主义的批判
Wittgenstein 维特根斯坦
Wittgenstein’s Road to Philosophy 维特根斯坦的哲学之路
The New Wittgenstein 新的维特根斯坦
Language Games and Following Rules 语言游戏和遵守规则
Clarifying Metaphysical Language 澄清形而上学的语言
Austin 约翰?奥斯汀
Austin’s Unique Approach 奥斯汀的独特方法
The Notion of “Excuses” “辩解”的概念
The Benefits of Ordinary Language 日常语言的优点
Chapter 19 Phenomenology and Existentialism
现象学与存在主义
Husserl 埃德蒙德?胡塞尔
Husserl’s Life and Influence 胡塞尔的生平及影响
The Crisis of European Science 欧洲科学的危机
Descartes and Intentionality 笛卡尔和意向性
Phenomena and Phenomenological Bracketing 现象和现象学的加括号
The Life-World 生活世界
Heidegger 马丁?海德格尔
Heidegger’s Life 海德格尔的生平
Dasein as Being-in-the-World 作为在世的此在
Dasein as Concern 作为操心的此在
Religious Existentialism 宗教存在主义
Jaspers’s Existence Philosophy 雅斯贝尔斯的生存哲学
Marcel’s Existentialism 马塞尔的存在主义
Sartre 让-保罗?萨特
Sartre’s Life 萨特的生平
Existence Precedes Essence 存在先于本质
Freedom and Responsibility 自由和责任
Nothingness and Bad Faith 虚无与坏的信仰
Human Consciousness 人的意识
Marxism and Freedom Revisited 马克思主义与重新检讨自由
Merleau-Ponty 莫里斯?梅洛-庞蒂
Merleau-Ponty’s Life 梅洛-庞蒂的生平
The Primacy of Perception 知觉的第一性
The Relativity of Knowledge 认识的相对性
Perception and Politics 知觉与政治
Chapter 20 Recent Philosophy 晚近的哲学
The Mind-Body Problem 身心问题
Ryle’s Ghost in the Machine 赖尔的机器中的幽灵
Identity Theory and Functionalism 同一论和功能主义
Searle’s Chinese Room Argument 塞尔的中文房间论证
Rorty 罗 蒂
Rorty’s Analytic Philosophy 罗蒂的分析哲学
The Influence of Pragmatism 实用主义的影响
The Contingency of Language 语言的偶然性
The Contingency of Selfhood 自我的偶然性
The Contingency of Community 共同体的偶然性
Virtue Theory Revisited 重提美德理论
Anscombe’s Defense 安斯康贝的辩护
Noddings’s Defense 诺丁斯的辩护
Virtue Epistemology 美德认识论
Continental Philosophy 大陆哲学
Structuralism 结构主义
Post-Structuralism 后结构主义
Postmodernism 后现代主义
Glossary of Key Concepts 重要词汇
Selected Bibliography 延伸阅读
Index 索引
內容試閱：
Chapter 2 The Sophists and Socrates
第二章 智者派与苏格拉底
SOCRATES 苏格拉底
Many Athenians mistook Socrates for a Sophist. The fact is that
Socrates was one of the Sophists’ keenest critics. That Socrates
should have been identified with them was due in part to his
relentless analysis of any and every subject—a technique also
employed by the Sophists. Nevertheless, there was a fundamental
difference between the Sophists and Socrates. The Sophists split
hairs to show that equally good arguments could be advanced on
either side of any issue. They were skeptics who doubted that there
could be any certain or reliable knowledge. Moreover, they
concluded that since all knowledge is relative, moral standards are
also relative. Socrates, on the other hand, had a different
motivation for his constant argumentation. He was committed to the
pursuit of truth and considered it his mission to seek out the
basis for stable and certain knowledge. He was also attempting to
discover the foundation of the good life. As he pursued his
mission, Socrates devised a method for arriving at truth; he linked
knowing and doing, so that to know the good is to do the good. In
that sense “knowledge is virtue.” Unlike the Sophists, then,
Socrates engaged in argumentation, not to attain ends destructive
of truth or to develop pragmatic skills among lawyers and
politicians, but to achieve substantive concepts of truth and
goodness.
Socrates’ Life 苏格拉底的生平
Seldom has there been a time and place so rich in genius as the
Athens into which Socrates was born in 470 BCE. By this time the
playwright Aeschylus had written some of his great dramatic works.
The playwrights Euripides and Sophocles were young boys who would
go on to produce great tragedies that Socrates may well have
attended. Pericles, who was to usher in a great age of democracy
and the flowering of the arts, was still a young man. Socrates may
have seen the Parthenon and the statues of Phidias completed during
his lifetime. By this time, too, Persia had been defeated, and
Athens was becoming a naval power with control over much of the
Aegean Sea. Athens had reached a level of unprecedented power and
splendor. Although Socrates grew up in a golden age, his declining
years were to see Athens defeated in war and his own life brought
to an end in prison. In 399 BCE, at the age of 71, he drank hemlock
poison in compliance with the death sentence issued by the court
that tried him.
Socrates wrote nothing. Most of what we know about him has been
preserved by three of his famous younger
contemporaries—Aristophanes, Xenophon, and, most importantly,
Plato. From these sources Socrates emerges as an intense genius
who, along with extraordinary intellectual rigor, possessed a
personal warmth and a fondness for humor. He was a robust man with
great powers of physical endurance. In his playful comedy The
Clouds, Aristophanes depicts Socrates as a strutting waterfowl,
poking fun at his habit of rolling his eyes and referring impishly
to his “pupils” and “thinking shop.” From Xenophon comes the
portrait of a loyal soldier who had a passion for discussing the
requirements of morality and who inevitably attracted younger
people who sought his advice. Plato confirms this general portrait
and in addition pictures Socrates as a man with a deep sense of
mission and absolute moral purity. In the Symposium Plato relates
how Alcibiades, a fair youth, expected to win the amorous
affections of Socrates, contriving in various ways to be alone with
him. But, Alcibiades says, “nothing of the sort occurred at all: he
would merely converse with me in his usual manner, and when he had
spent the day with me he would leave me and go his way.” In
military campaigns Socrates could go without food longer than
anyone else. Others wrapped themselves up with “unusual care”
against the bitter cold of winter, using “felt and little fleeces”
over their shoes. But Socrates, Alcibiades says, “walked out in
that weather, dressed in a coat that he was always inclined to
wear, and he made his way more easily over the ice without shoes
than the rest of us did in our shoes.”
Socrates was capable of intense and sustained concentration. On
one occasion during a military campaign, he stood in deep
contemplation for a day and night, “till dawn came and the sun
rose; then walked away after offering a prayer to the sun.” He
frequently received messages or warnings from a mysterious “voice,”
or what he called his daimon. Although this “supernatural” sign
invaded his thoughts from early childhood, it suggests more than
anything else Socrates’ “visionary” nature, particularly his
sensitivity to the moral qualities of human actions that make life
worth living. He must have been familiar with the natural science
of the earlier Greek philosophers, although he does say in Plato’s
Apology that “the simple truth is, O Athenians, that I have nothing
to do with physical speculations.” For him such speculations gave
way to the more urgent questions about human nature, truth, and
goodness. The decisive event that confirmed his mission as a moral
philosopher was the reply of the Delphic Oracle. As the story goes,
one day a young religious zealot named Chaerophon went to the
temple of Apollo near Delphi and asked whether there was any living
person who was wiser than Socrates; the priestess replied that
there was not. Socrates interpreted this reply to mean that he was
the wisest because he realized and admitted his own ignorance. In
this attitude Socrates set out on his quest for unshakable truth
and wisdom.
Socrates as a Philosopher 作为哲学家的苏格拉底
Because Socrates left no writings of his own, there is today some
disagreement over what philosophical ideas can be properly
attributed to him. Our most extensive sources of his thought are
the Dialogues of Plato, in which he is the leading character. But
the persistent question is whether Plato is here reporting what
Socrates actually taught or is expressing his own ideas through the
figure of Socrates. Some argue that the Socrates found in Plato’s
dialogues is the historically correct Socrates. This would mean
that Socrates must get all the credit for the novel philosophical
activity these dialogues contain. On this view Plato would get
credit only for the literary form he devised for preserving,
elaborating on, and lending precision and color to Socrates’
thought. On the other hand, Aristotle distinguished between the
philosophical contributions made by Socrates and Plato. Aristotle
gave Socrates credit for “inductive arguments and universal
definitions,” and to Plato he ascribed the development of the
famous theory of Forms—the notion that universal archetypes exist
independently of the particular things that embody them. In
essence, the argument is over whether Socrates or Plato developed
the theory of Forms. Since Aristotle was himself particularly
interested in this subject and had discussed it at length with
Plato in the Academy, it seems reasonable to suppose that his
distinction between Socrates’ and Plato’s ideas is accurate. At the
same time some of the early dialogues appear to represent Socrates’
own thought, as in the case of the Apology and the Euthyphro. The
most plausible solution to the problem, therefore, is to accept
portions of both views. Thus, we can agree that much of the earlier
dialogues are portrayals of Socrates’ philosophic activity, while
the later dialogues especially represent Plato’s own philosophic
development, including his formulation of the metaphysical theory
of the Forms. On this basis we should see Socrates as an original
philosopher who developed a new method of intellectual
inquiry.
If Socrates was to be successful in overcoming the relativism and
skepticism of the Sophists, he had to discover some immovable
foundation upon which to build an edifice of knowledge. Socrates
discovered this foundation within people, and not in the facts of
the external world. The inner life, said Socrates, is the seat of a
unique activity—the activity of knowing, which leads to the
practical activity of doing. To describe this activity, Socrates
developed the conception of the soul, or psyche. For him the soul
was not any particular faculty, nor was it any special kind of
substance. Instead, it was the capacity for intelligence and
character; it was a person’s conscious personality. Socrates
further described what he meant by the soul as “that within us in
virtue of which we are pronounced wise or foolish, good or bad.” By
describing it in these terms, Socrates identified the soul with the
normal powers of intelligence and character, not as some ghostly
substance. The soul was the structure of personality. However
difficult it may have been for Socrates to describe exactly what
the soul is, he was sure that the activity of the soul is to know
and to influence or even direct and govern a person’s daily
conduct. Although for Socrates the soul was not a thing, he could
say that our greatest concern should be the proper care of our
souls so as to “make the soul as good as possible.” We take best
care of our souls when we understand the difference between fact
and fancy, and thereby build our thought upon a knowledge of what
human life is really like. Having attained such knowledge, those
who have the proper care of their soul in mind will conduct their
behavior in accordance with their knowledge of true moral values.
In a nutshell Socrates was primarily concerned with the good life,
and not with mere contemplation.
For Socrates the key point in this conception of the soul
concerns our conscious awareness of what some words mean. To know
that some things contradict others—for example, that justice cannot
mean harming others—is a typical example of what the soul can
discover simply by using its abilities to know. We thus do violence
to our human nature when we act in defiance of this knowledge, such
as when we harm someone while fully aware that such behavior is
contrary to our knowledge of justice. Socrates was certain that
people could attain sure and reliable knowledge, and that only such
knowledge could be the proper basis of morality. His first major
task, therefore, was to clarify for himself and his followers just
how one attains reliable knowledge.
Socrates’ Theory of Knowledge: Intellectual Midwifery
苏格拉底的知识理论：思想的助产术
Socrates was convinced that the surest way to attain reliable
knowledge was through the practice of disciplined conversation,
with this conversation acting as an intellectual midwife. This
method, which he called dialectic, is a deceptively simple
technique. It always begins with a discussion of the most obvious
aspects of any problem. Through the process of dialogue, in which
all parties to the conversation are forced to clarify their ideas,
the final outcome of the conversation is a clear statement of what
is meant. Although the technique appeared simple, it was not long
before anyone upon whom Socrates employed it could feel its intense
rigor, as well as the discomfort of Socrates’ irony. In the
earliest dialogues in which this method is displayed, Socrates
pretends to be ignorant about a subject and then tries to draw out
from the other people their fullest possible knowledge about it.
His assumption was that by progressively correcting incomplete or
inaccurate notions, he could coax the truth out of anyone. He would
often expose contradictions lurking beneath the other person’s
views—a technique called elenchus—and thereby force the person to
abandon his or her misdirected opinion. If the human mind was
incapable of knowing something, Socrates would want to demonstrate
that, too. Accordingly, he believed that no unexamined idea is
worth having any more than the unexamined life is worth living.
Some dialogues therefore end inconclusively, since Socrates was
concerned not with imposing a set of dogmatic ideas upon his
listeners but with leading them through an orderly process of
thought.
We find a good example of Socrates’ method in Plato’s dialogue
Euthyphro. The scene is in front of the hall of King Archon, where
Socrates is waiting in the hope of discovering who has brought suit
against him for impiety, which was a capital offense. Young
Euthyphro arrives on the scene and explains that he plans to bring
charges of impiety against his own father. With devastating irony
Socrates expresses relief at his good fortune in meeting him, for
Euthyphro is making the identical charge against his father that
has been made against Socrates. Sarcastically, Socrates says to
Euthyphro that “not every one could rightly do what you are doing;
only a man who is well advanced in wisdom.” Only someone who knew
exactly what impiety meant would charge anyone with such a serious
offense.And to bring such a charge against one’s father would only
corroborate the assumption that the accuser knew what he was
talking about. Socrates professes ignorance of the meaning of
impiety and asks Euthyphro to explain what it means, since he has
charged his father with this offense.
Euthyphro answers Socrates by defining piety as “prosecuting the
wrongdoer” and impiety as not prosecuting him. To this Socrates
replies, “I did not ask you to tell me one or two of all the many
pious actions that there are; I want to know what is the concept of
piety which makes all pious actions pious.” Since his first
definition was unsatisfactory, Euthyphro tries again, this time
saying that “what is pleasing to the gods is pious.” But Socrates
points out that the gods quarrel among themselves, which shows that
they disagree about what is better and worse. The same act, then,
can be pleasing to some gods and not pleasing to others. So,
Euthyphro’s second definition is also inadequate. Trying to repair
the damage, Euthyphro offers a new definition, saying that “piety
is what all the gods love, and impiety is what they all hate.” But,
asks Socrates, “do the gods love an act because it is pious, or is
it pious because the gods love it?” In short, what is the essence
of piety? Trying again, Euthyphro says that piety is “that part of
justice which has to do with the attention which is due to the
gods.” Again, Socrates presses for a clearer definition by asking
what kind of attention is due to the gods. By this time Euthyphro
is hopelessly adrift, and Socrates says, “It cannot be that you
would ever have undertaken to prosecute your aged father . . .
unless you had known exactly what is piety and impiety.” And when
Socrates presses him once more for a clearer definition, Euthyphro
answers, “Another time . . . Socrates. I am in a hurry now, and it
is time for me to be off.”
The dialogue ends inconclusively as far as the subject of piety
is concerned. Nevertheless, it is a vivid example of Socrates’
method of dialectic and a portrayal of his conception of the
philosophical life. More specifically, it illustrates Socrates’
unique concern with definition as the instrument of clear
thought.
The Importance of Definition
Nowhere is Socrates’ approach to knowledge more clearly displayed
than in his preoccupation with the process of definition. It is
also in his emphasis on definition that Socrates most decisively
combats the Sophists: Terms have definite meanings, and this
undermines relativism. For him a definition is a clear and fixed
concept. Although particular events or things varied in some
respects or passed away, Socrates was impressed with the fact that
something about them was the same—that is, never varied and never
passed away. This was their definition, or their essential nature.
It was this permanent meaning that Socrates wanted Euthyphro to
give him when he asked for that “concept of Piety which makes all
pious acts pious.” In a similar way Socrates sought after the
concept of Justice by which acts become just, and the concept of
Beauty by which particular things are said to be beautiful, and the
concept of Goodness by which we recognize human acts to be good.
For example, no particular thing is perfectly beautiful; it is
beautiful only because it partakes of the larger concept of Beauty.
Moreover, when a beautiful thing passes away, the concept of Beauty
remains. Socrates was struck by our ability to think about general
ideas and not only about particular things.
He argued that in some way we think of two different kinds of
objects whenever we think about anything. A beautiful flower is at
once this particular flower and at the same time an examplar or
partaker of the general or universal meaning of Beauty. Definition,
for Socrates, involves a process by which our minds can distinguish
or sort out these two objects of thought, namely, the particular
this beautiful flower and the general or universal the concept
of Beauty of which this flower partakes so as to make it a
beautiful flower. If Socrates asked, “What is a beautiful flower?”
or “What is a pious act?” he would not be satisfied with your
pointing to this flower or this act. For, although Beauty is in
some way connected with a given thing, that thing does not either
equal or exhaust the concept of Beauty. Moreover, although various
beautiful things differ from each other, whether they are flowers
or people, they are each called beautiful because, in spite of
their differences, they share in common that element by which they
are called beautiful. Only by the rigorous process of definition
can we finally grasp the distinction between a particular thing
this beautiful flower and the general fixed notion Beauty or
beautiful. The process of definition, as Socrates worked it out,
is a process for arriving at clear and fixed concepts.
Through this technique of definition, Socrates showed that true
knowledge is more than simply an inspection of facts. Knowledge has
to do with our ability to discover in facts the abiding elements
that remain after the facts disappear. Beauty remains after the
rose fades. To the mind an imperfect triangle suggests the
Triangle; imperfect circles are seen as approximations to the
perfect Circle, the definition of which produces the clear and
fixed notion of Circle. Facts can produce a variety of notions, for
no two flowers are the same. By the same token no two people and no
two cultures are the same. If we limited our knowledge simply to
uninterpreted facts, we would conclude that everything is
different, and there are no universal likenesses. The Sophists did
just this, and from the facts they collected about other cultures,
they argued that all notions of justice and goodness are relative.
But Socrates would not accept this conclusion. To him the factual
differences between people—for example, the differences in their
height, strength, and mental ability—did not obscure the equally
certain fact that they were all people. By his process of
definition, he cut through the obvious factual differences about
particular people and discovered what makes each person a person,
in spite of the differences. His clear concept of humanness
provided him with a firm basis for thinking about people.
Similarly, though cultures differ, though their actual laws and
moral rules differ, still, said Socrates, the notions of Law,
Justice, and Goodness can be defined as rigorously as the notion of
human being. Instead of leading to intellectual skepticism and
moral relativism, Socrates believed that the variety of facts
around us could yield clear and fixed concepts, so long as we
employed the technique of analysis and definition.
Behind the world of facts, then, Socrates believed there was an
order in things that we could discover. This led him to introduce
into philosophy a way of looking at everything in the universe,
namely, a teleological conception of things—the view that things
have a function or purpose and tend toward the good. To say, for
example, that a person has a definable nature is also to say that a
special activity is appropriate to his or her nature. If people are
rational beings, acting rationally is the behavior appropriate to
human nature. From this it is a short step to saying that people
ought to act rationally. By discovering the essential nature of
everything, Socrates believed that he could thereby also discover
the intelligible order in everything. On this view, not only do
things have their own specific natures and functions, but these
functions have some additional purpose in the whole scheme of
things. There are many kinds of things in the universe, not because
of some haphazard mixture, but because each thing does one thing
best, and things acting together make up the orderly universe.
Clearly, Socrates could distinguish between two levels of
knowledge, one based upon the inspection of facts and the other
based upon the interpretation of facts. Alternatively, one is based
on particular things and the other on general or universal
concepts.
The fact that universal concepts, such as Beauty, Straight,
Triangle, and Human Being, are always used in discourse certainly
suggests that there is some basis in reality for their use. The big
question is whether these universal concepts refer to some existing
reality in the same way that particular words do. If the word John
refers to a person existing in a particular place, does the concept
Human Being also refer to some reality someplace? Whether Socrates
dealt with this problem of the metaphysical status of universals
depends on whether we consider Plato or Socrates to be the author
of the theory of the Forms. Plato certainly taught that these
conceptual Forms, whatever they are, are the most real things there
are and that they have a separate existence from the particular
things we see, which partake of these Forms. Aristotle rejected
this theory of the separate existence of Forms, arguing that in
some way universal forms exist only in the actual things we
experience. He showed, too, that Socrates had not “separated off”
these Forms from things. If Socrates was not the author of the
theory of Forms, found in the Platonic dialogues, he was,
nevertheless, the one who fashioned the notion of an intelligible
order lying behind the visible world.
Socrates’ Moral Thought 苏格拉底的道德思想
For Socrates knowledge and virtue were the same thing. If virtue
has to do with “making the soul as good as possible,” it is first
necessary to know what makes the soul good. Therefore, goodness and
knowledge are closely related. But Socrates said more about
morality than simply this. He in fact identified goodness and
knowledge, saying that to know the good is to do the good, that
knowledge is virtue. By identifying knowledge and virtue, Socrates
meant also to say that vice, or evil, is the absence of knowledge.
Just as knowledge is virtue, so, too, vice is ignorance. The
outcome of this line of reasoning was Socrates’ conviction that no
one ever indulged in vice or committed an evil act knowingly.
Wrongdoing, he said, is always involuntary, being the product of
ignorance.
To equate virtue with knowledge and vice with ignorance may seem
to contradict our most elementary human experiences. Common sense
tells us that we frequently indulge in acts that we know to be
wrong, so that wrongdoing for us is a deliberate and voluntary act.
Socrates would have readily agreed that we commit acts that can be
called evil. He denied, however, that people deliberately performed
evil acts because they knew them to be evil. When people commit
evil acts, said Socrates, they always do them thinking that they
are good in some way.
When he equated virtue and knowledge, Socrates had in mind a
particular conception of virtue. For him virtue meant fulfilling
one’s function. As a rational being, a person’s function is to
behave rationally. At the same time, every human being has the
inescapable desire for happiness or the well-being of his or her
soul. This inner well-being, this “making the soul as good as
possible,” can be achieved only by certain appropriate types of
behavior. Because we have a desire for happiness, we choose our
acts with the hope that they will bring us happiness. Which acts,
or what behavior, will produce happiness? Socrates knew that some
forms of behavior appear to produce happiness, but in reality do
not. For this reason we frequently choose acts that may in
themselves be questionable but that we nevertheless think will
bring us happiness. Thieves may know that stealing as such is
wrong, but they steal in the hope that it will bring them
happiness. Similarly, we pursue power, physical pleasure, and
property, which are the symbols of success and happiness, confusing
these with the true ground of happiness.
The equating of vice with ignorance is not so contrary to common
sense after all, since the ignorance Socrates speaks of refers to
an act’s ability to produce happiness, not to the act itself. It is
ignorance about one’s soul, about what it takes to “make the soul
as good as possible.” Wrongdoing is, therefore, a consequence of an
inaccurate estimate of types of behavior. It is the inaccurate
expectation that certain kinds of things or pleasures will produce
happiness. Wrongdoing, then, is the product of ignorance simply
because it is done with the hope that it will do what it cannot do.
Ignorance consists in failing to see that certain behavior cannot
produce happiness. It takes a true knowledge of human nature to
know what is required to be happy. It also takes a true knowledge
of things and types of behavior to know whether they can fulfill
the human requirements for happiness. And it requires knowledge to
be able to distinguish between what appears to give happiness and
what really does.
To say, then, that vice is ignorance and is involuntary is to say
that no one ever deliberately chooses to damage, disfigure, or
destroy his or her human nature. Even when we choose pain, we do so
with the expectation that this pain will lead to virtue and to the
fulfillment of our human nature—a nature that seeks its own
well-being.We always think we are acting rightly. But whether our
actions are right depends on whether they harmonize with true human
nature, and this is a matter of true knowledge. Moreover, because
Socrates believed that the fundamental structure of human nature is
constant, he also believed that virtuous behavior is constant as
well. This was the basis for his great triumph over the Sophists’
skepticism and relativism. Socrates set the direction that moral
philosophy would take throughout the history of Western
civilization. His thought was modified by Plato, Aristotle, and the
Christian theologians, but it remained the dominant intellectual
and moral tradition around which other variations developed.
Socrates’ Trial and Death 苏格拉底的审判和死亡
Convinced that the care of the human soul should be our greatest
concern, Socrates spent most of his time examining his own life, as
well as the lives and thoughts of other Athenians. While Athens was
a secure and powerful democracy under Pericles, Socrates could
pursue his mission as a “gadfly” without serious opposition. He
relentlessly looked for the stable and constant moral order
underlying people’s irregular behavior. This quest proved
alternately irritating and amusing and gave him the reputation as
an intellectual who dealt in paradoxes. Worse still, people
believed that he thought too freely about sensitive issues that,
according to many Athenians, shouldn’t be questioned. Nevertheless,
as long as Athens was in a position of economic and military
strength, Socrates could question things as he pleased, without
penalty. However, as Athens’ social climate moved toward a
condition of crisis and defeat, Socrates was no longer immune from
sanction. His efforts to develop dialectical skill among young
people from leading families had raised suspicions—particularly the
skill of asking searching questions about customs in moral,
religious, and political behavior. But his actions were not
considered a clear and present danger until Athens was at war with
Sparta.
A series of events connected with this war eventually led to the
trial and sentence of Socrates. One event was the traitorous
actions of Alcibiades, whom the Athenians knew was Socrates’ pupil.
Alcibiades actually went to Sparta and gave valuable advice to the
Spartans in their war with Athens. Inevitably, many Athenians
concluded that Socrates must in some way be responsible for what
Alcibiades did. In addition, Socrates found himself in serious
disagreement with the Committee of the Senate of Five Hundred, of
which he was a member. The issue before them was the case of eight
military commanders who were charged with negligence at a naval
battle off the islands of Arginusae. The Athenians won this battle,
but at the staggering cost of 25 ships and 4000 men. It was decided
that the eight generals involved in this expensive campaign should
be brought to trial. However, instead of determining the guilt of
each general one by one, the Committee was instructed to take a
single vote concerning the guilt of the whole group. At first the
Committee resisted this move, holding it to be a violation of
regular constitutional procedures. But when the prosecutors
threatened to add the names of the Committee members to the list of
generals, only Socrates stood his ground; the rest of the Committee
capitulated. The generals were then found guilty, and the six of
them who were in custody were immediately put to death. These
events occurred in 406 BCE. In 404 BCE, with the fall of Athens,
Socrates once again found himself in opposition to a formidable
group. Under pressure from the Spartan victor, a Commission of
Thirty was set up to fashion legislation for the new government of
Athens. Instead, this group became a violent oligarchy, arbitrarily
executing former supporters of Pericles’ democratic order and
seizing property for themselves. Within a year this oligarchy had
been removed by force and a democratic order restored.
Unfortunately for Socrates, however, some of the members of the
revolutionary oligarchy had been his close friends, particularly
Critias and Charmides. This was another occasion of guilt by
association, as in the case of Alcibiades, whereby Socrates was put
in the position of being a teacher of traitors. By this time,
irritation had developed into distrust, and in 399 BCE, Socrates
was brought to trial on the charge, as the Greek philosopher
Diogenes Laertius recorded it, “1 of not worshipping the gods
whom the State worships, but introducing new and unfamiliar
religious practices; 2 and, further, of corrupting the young. The
prosecutor demands the death penalty.”
Socrates could have gone into voluntary exile upon hearing the
charges against him. Instead, he remained in Athens and defended
himself before a court whose jury numbered about 500. His defense,
as recorded in Plato’s Apology, is a brilliant proof of his
intellectual prowess. It is also a powerful exposure of his
accusers’ motives and the inadequacy of the grounds for their
charges. He emphasized his lifelong devotion to Athens, including
references to his military service and his actions in upholding
constitutional procedures in the trial of the generals. His defense
is a model of forceful argument, resting wholly on a recitation of
facts and on the requirements of rational discourse. When he was
found guilty, he was given the opportunity to suggest his own
sentence. Being convinced not only of his innocence but of the
value of his type of life and teachings to Athens, he proposed that
Athens should reward him by giving him what he deserved. Comparing
himself to someone “who has won victory at the Olympic games with
his horse or chariots,” Socrates said, “such a man only makes you
seem happy, but I make you really happy.” Therefore, he said, his
reward should be “public maintenance in the prytaneum,” an honor
bestowed on eminent Athenians, generals, Olympians, and other
outstanding people. Affronted by his arrogance, the jury sentenced
him to death.
To the end his friends tried to make possible his escape, but
Socrates would have none of it. Just as he refused to play on the
emotions of the jury by calling attention to his wife and young
children, so now he was not impressed by the plea of his student,
Crito, that he should think of his children. How could he undo all
he had taught others and unmake his conviction that he must never
play fast and loose with the truth? Socrates was convinced that to
escape would be to defy and thereby injure Athens and its
procedures of law. That would be to strike at the wrong target. The
laws were not responsible for his trial and sentence; it was his
misguided accusers, Anytus and Meletus, who were at fault.
Accordingly, he confirmed his respect for the laws and the
procedures by complying with the court’s sentence.
Describing Socrates’ last moments after he drank the poisonous
hemlock, Plato writes in his Phaedo that “Socrates felt himself,
and said that when it came to his heart, he should be gone. He was
already growing cold . . . and spoke for the last time. Crito, he
said, I owe a cock to Asclepius; do not forget to pay it . . . Such
was the end . . . of our friend, a man, I think, who was, of all
the men of his time, the best, the wisest and the most just.”
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